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1 Introduction
Semantic theories of natural language associate meanings with utterances by
providing meanings for lexical items and rules for determining the meaning of
larger units given the meanings of their parts. Meanings are often assumed
to combine via function application, which works well when constituent
structure trees are used to guide semantic composition. However, we believe
that the functional structure of Lexical-Functional Grammar is best used
to provide the syntactic information necessary for constraining derivations
of meaning in a cross-linguistically uniform format. It has been difficult,
however, to reconcile this approach with the combination of meanings by
function application.
In contrast to compositional approaches, we present a deductive ap-
proach to assembling meanings, based on reasoning with constraints, which
meshes well with the unordered nature of information in the functional struc-
ture. Our use of linear logic as a ‘glue’ for assembling meanings allows for a
coherent treatment of the LFG requirements of completeness and coherence
as well as of modification and quantification.
2 The Framework
This paper provides a brief overview of our ongoing investigation in the use
of formal deduction to explicate the relationship between syntactic analyses
∗Dalrymple, Lamping, Saraswat: Xerox PARC, Palo Alto CA 94304;
{dalrymple,lamping,saraswat}@parc.xerox.com. Pereira: AT&T Bell Laboratories,
Murray Hill NJ 07974; pereira@research.att.com
1
in Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG) and semantic interpretations (Dal-
rymple, Lamping, and Saraswat, 1993; Dalrymple et al., 1993; Dalrymple
et al., 1994a; Dalrymple et al., 1994b; Dalrymple et al., 1995; Dalrymple et
al., 1995). We use linear logic (Girard, 1987) to represent the connection
between two dissimilar linguistic levels: LFG f-structures and their semantic
interpretations.
F-structures provide a uniform representation of syntactic information
relevant to semantic interpretation that abstracts away from the varying
details of phrase structure and linear order in particular languages. But as
noted by Halvorsen (1983) and Reyle (1988), the flatter, unordered func-
tional structure of LFG does not fit well with traditional semantic composi-
tionality, based on functional abstraction and application, which mandates
a rigid order of semantic composition. We are thus led to a more relaxed
form of compositionality, in which, as in more traditional ones, the seman-
tics of each lexical entry in a sentence is used exactly once in interpretation,
but without imposing a rigid order of composition. Approaches to seman-
tic interpretation that encode semantic representations in attribute-value
structures (Pollard and Sag, 1987; Fenstad et al., 1987; Pollard and Sag,
1994) offer such a relaxation of compositionality, but are unable to properly
represent constraints on variable binding and scope (Pereira, 1990).
The present approach, in which linear logic is used to specify the relation
between f-structures and their meanings, provides exactly what is required
for a calculus of semantic composition for LFG. It can directly represent
the constraints on the creation and use of semantic units in sentence inter-
pretation, including those pertaining to variable binding and scope, without
forcing a particular hierarchical order of composition, except as required by
the properties of particular lexical entries.
2.1 Syntax
In languages like English, the substantial scaffolding provided by surface
constituent structure trees is often a useful guide for semantic composition,
and the λ-calculus is a convenient formalism for assembling the semantics
along that scaffolding (Montague, 1974). This is because the derivation
of the meaning of a phrase can often be viewed as mirroring the surface
constituent structure of the English phrase. The sentence ‘Bill appointed
Hillary’ has the surface constituent structure indicated by the bracketing in
1:
(1) [S [NP Bill] [VP appointed [NP Hillary]]]
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The verb is viewed as bearing a close syntactic relation to the object and
forming a constituent with it; this constituent then combines with the sub-
ject of the sentence. Similarly, the meaning of the verb can be viewed as a
two-place function which is applied first to the object, then to the subject,
producing the meaning of the sentence.
However, this approach is not as natural for languages whose surface
structure does not resemble English. For instance, a problem is presented
by VSO languages such as Irish (McCloskey, 1979). To preserve the hy-
pothesis that surface constituent structure provides the proper scaffolding
for semantic interpretation in VSO languages, one of two assumptions must
be made. One must assume either that semantic composition is nonuniform
across languages (leading to loss of explanatory power), or that semantic
composition proceeds not with reference to surface syntactic structure, but
instead with reference to a more abstract (English-like) constituent structure
representation. This second hypothesis seems to us to render vacuous the
claim that surface constituent structure is useful in semantic composition.
Further problems are encountered in the semantic analysis of a free word
order language such as Warlpiri (Simpson, 1991), where surface constituent
structure does not always give rise to units that are semantically coherent
or useful. Here, an argument of a verb may not even appear as a single unit
at surface constituent structure; further, arguments of a verb may appear in
various different places in the string. In such cases, the appeal to an order
of composition different from that of English is particularly unattractive,
since different orders of composition would be needed for each possible word
order sequence.
The observation that surface constituent structure does not always pro-
vide the optimal set of constituents or hierarchical structure to guide se-
mantic interpretation has led to efforts to use a more abstract structure to
guide semantic composition. As originally proposed by Kaplan and Bresnan
(1982) and Halvorsen (1983), the functional structure or f-structure of LFG
is a representation of such a structure. The c-structure and f-structure for
sentence (2) are given in (3):
(2) Bill appointed Hillary.
3
(3) C-structure: F-structure:
S
NP VP
V NP
Bill appointed Hillary


pred ‘appoint’
subj
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj
[
pred ‘Hillary’
]


As illustrated, an f-structure represents the more abstract syntactic function-
argument structure of the sentence, encoding relations such as subj and
obj. Those relations are realized in different c-structure forms in different
languages, but are represented directly and uniformly in the f-structure.
Formally, an f-structure consists of a collection of attributes, such as pred,
subj, and obj, whose values can, in turn, be other f-structures.
We will not provide a detailed account of the relation between c-structure
and f-structure; for such an account, see Bresnan (1982), Levin, Rappaport,
and Zaenen (1983), and the references cited there. Here, we will begin
with the f-structures for the examples we discuss, and concentrate on an
exposition of how the f-structure provides information necessary to carry
out a semantic deduction.
2.2 Semantic Projections
Following work by Kaplan (1987) and Halvorsen and Kaplan (1988), we
make use of a semantic or σ-projection function σ to map f-structures to
semantic or σ-structures encoding information about f-structure meaning.
For a particular use of ‘Bill’, the resulting configuration is:
(4) h :
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
hσ :[ ]❀Bill
The semantic projection function σ is represented by an arrow. We use
labels such as h to refer to particular f-structures. The association between
the semantic structure hσ and a meaning P can be represented by the atomic
formula hσ❀P , which we will refer to as a meaning constructor, where ❀
is an otherwise uninterpreted binary predicate symbol. (In fact, we use
not one but a family of relations ❀τ indexed by the semantic type of the
intended second argument, although for simplicity we will omit the type
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subscript whenever it is determinable from context.) For the case at hand,
if a particular occurrence of ‘Bill’ in a sentence is associated with f-structure
h, the semantic constraint will be instantiated as:
hσ❀Bill
representing the association between hσ and the constant Bill representing
its meaning.
We will often informally say that P is h’s meaning without referring
to the role of the semantic structure hσ in hσ❀P . Actually, however, f-
structures and their semantic projections must be distinguished, because
semantic projections can carry more information than just the association to
the meaning for the corresponding f-structure; see Dalrymple et al. (1994b)
for more discussion.
As noted above, the λ-calculus is not a very natural tool for combin-
ing meanings of f-structure constituents. The problem is that the subcon-
stituents of an f-structure are unordered, and so the fixed order of combina-
tion of a functor with its arguments imposed by the λ-calculus is no longer
an advantage; in fact, it becomes a disadvantage, since an artificial ordering
must be imposed on the composition of meanings. Furthermore, the com-
ponents of the f-structure may be not only complements but also modifiers,
which contribute to the final semantics in a very different way.
Instead, we assume that lexical entries contribute premises – meaning
constructors – to a logical deduction. The meaning constructor is a linear
logic formula that can be understood as ‘instructions’ for combining the
meanings of the lexical entry’s syntactic arguments to obtain the meaning
of the f-structure headed by the entry. In effect, then, our approach uses
linear logic as the ‘glue’ with which semantic representations are assembled.
Once all the constraints are assembled, deduction in the logic is used to infer
the meaning of the entire structure. Throughout this process we maintain a
sharp distinction between assertions about the meaning (the glue) and the
meaning itself.
In the case of the verb ‘appointed’, the meaning constructor is a formula
consisting of instructions on how to assemble the meaning of a sentence with
main verb ‘appointed’, given the meanings of its subject and object. The
verb ‘appointed’ contributes the following f-structure and meaning construc-
tor:
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(5)
f :


pred ‘appoint’
subj [ ]
obj [ ]

 fσ :[ ]
∀X,Y. (f subj)
σ
❀X ⊗ (f obj)
σ
❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y )
The meaning constructor, given in the last line of (5), asserts that:
• if f ’s subject (f subj) has meaning X
• and (⊗) f ’s object (f obj) has meaning Y
• then ( −◦ ) f has meaning appoint (X,Y ).
The linear-logic connectives of multiplicative conjunction ⊗ and linear im-
plication −◦ are used to specify how the meaning of a clause headed by the
verb is composed from the meanings of the arguments of the verb. For the
moment, we can think of the linear connectives as playing the same role as
the analogous classical connectives conjunction ∧ and implication →, but
we will see that the specific properties of the linear connectives are essential
to guarantee that lexical entries bring into the interpretation process all and
only the information provided by the corresponding words.
We will now show how meanings are assembled by linear-logic deduction.
For readability, we will present derivations informally. As a first example,
consider the following f-structures:
(6)
f :


pred ‘appoint’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:
[
pred ‘Hillary’
]


From the lexical entries for ‘Bill’, ‘Hillary’, and ‘appointed’, we obtain the
following meaning constructors, abbreviated as bill, hillary, and appointed:1
bill: gσ❀Bill
hillary: hσ❀Hillary
appointed: ∀X,Y. gσ❀X ⊗ hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y )
In the following, assume that the formula bill-appointed is defined thus:
bill-appointed: ∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (Bill , Y )
1For the sake of illustration, we will provide only the simplest semantics for the lexical
entries we discuss, ignoring (among other issues) the representation of tense and aspect.
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Then the following derivation is possible in linear logic (⊢ stands for the
linear-logic entailment relation):
(7) bill⊗ hillary⊗ appointed (Premises.)
⊢ bill-appointed⊗ hillary X 7→ Bill
⊢ fσ❀appoint (Bill ,Hillary) Y 7→ Hillary
Of course, another derivation is also possible. Assume that the formula
appointed-hillary is defined as:
appointed-hillary: ∀X. gσ❀X −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Hillary)
Then we have the following derivation:
(8) bill⊗ hillary⊗ appointed (Premises.)
⊢ bill⊗ appointed-hillary Y 7→ Hillary
⊢ fσ❀appoint (Bill ,Hillary) X 7→ Bill
yielding the same conclusion.
In summary, each word in a sentence contributes a linear-logic for-
mula, its meaning constructor, relating the semantic projections of specific
f-structures in the LFG analysis to representations of their meanings. From
these formulas, the interpretation process attempts to deduce an atomic
formula relating the semantic projection of the whole sentence to a repre-
sentation of the sentence’s meaning. Alternative derivations can sometimes
yield different such conclusions, corresponding to ambiguities of semantic
interpretation.
In LFG, syntactic predicate-argument structure is projected from lexical
entries. Therefore, its effect on semantic composition will for the most part
– in fact, in all the cases considered in this paper – be determined by lexical
entries, not by phrase-structure rules. In particular, the phrase-structure
rules for S and VP in the examples discussed above need not encode semantic
information, but only specify how grammatical functions such as subj are
expressed in English. In some cases, the constituent structure of a syntactic
construction may make a direct semantic contribution, as when properties of
the construction as a whole and not just of its lexical elements are responsible
for the interpretation of the construction. Such cases include, for instance,
relative clauses with no complementizer (‘the man Bill met’). We will not
discuss construction-specific interpretation rules in this paper.
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3 Linear logic
An important motivation for using linear logic is that it allows us to directly
capture the intuition that lexical items and phrases each contribute exactly
once to the meaning of a sentence. As noted by Klein and Sag (1985,
page 172):
Translation rules in Montague semantics have the property that
the translation of each component of a complex expression occurs
exactly once in the translation of the whole. . . . That is to say,
we do not want the set S [of semantic representations of a phrase]
to contain all meaningful expressions of IL which can be built up
from the elements of S, but only those which use each element
exactly once.
In our terms, the semantic contributions of the constituents of a sentence are
not context-independent assertions that may be used or not in the derivation
of the meaning of the sentence depending on the course of the derivation.
Instead, the semantic contributions are occurrences of information which are
generated and used exactly once. For example, the formula gσ❀Bill can
be thought of as providing one occurrence of the meaning Bill associated to
the semantic projection gσ. That meaning must be consumed exactly once
(for example, by appointed in (7)) in the derivation of a meaning of the
entire utterance.
It is this ‘resource-sensitivity’ of natural language semantics—an expres-
sion is used exactly once in a semantic derivation—that linear logic can
model. The basic insight underlying linear logic is that logical formulas are
resources that are produced and consumed in the deduction process. This
gives rise to a resource-sensitive notion of implication, the linear implication
−◦ : the formula A −◦ B can be thought of as an action that can consume
(one copy of) A to produce (one copy of) B. Thus, the formula A⊗(A −◦ B)
linearly entails B. It does not entail A⊗B (because the deduction consumes
A), and it does not entail (A −◦ B) ⊗ B (because the linear implication is
also consumed in doing the deduction). This resource-sensitivity not only
disallows arbitrary duplication of formulas, but also disallows arbitrary dele-
tion of formulas. Thus the linear multiplicative conjunction ⊗ is sensitive
to the multiplicity of formulas: A⊗A is not equivalent to A (the former has
two copies of the formula A). For example, the formula A ⊗ A⊗ (A −◦ B)
linearly entails A ⊗ B (there is still one A left over) but does not entail B
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(there must still be one A present). The following table provides a summary:
INCORRECT: A −◦ (A⊗A)
INCORRECT: (A⊗B) −◦ A
CORRECT: (A⊗ (A −◦ B)) −◦ B
INCORRECT: (A⊗ (A −◦ B)) −◦ (A⊗B)
INCORRECT: (A⊗ (A −◦ B)) −◦ (A −◦ B)⊗B
In this way, linear logic checks that a formula is used once and only once in
a deduction, enforcing the requirement that each component of an utterance
contributes exactly once to the assembly of the utterance’s meaning.
A direct consequence of the above properties of linear logic is that the
constraints of functional completeness and coherence hold without further
stipulation2 (Dalrymple, Lamping, and Saraswat, 1993). In the present
setting, the feature structure f corresponding to the utterance is associated
with the (⊗) conjunction φ of all the formulas associated with the lexical
items in the utterance. The conjunction is said to be complete and coherent
iff Th ⊢ φ −◦ fσ❀t (for some term t), where Th is the background theory
of general linguistic principles. Each possible t is to be thought of as a valid
meaning for the sentence. This guarantees that the entries are used exactly
once in building up the denotation of the utterance: no syntactic or semantic
requirements may be left unfulfilled, and no meaning may remain unused.
Our glue language needs to be only a fragment of higher-order linear
logic, the tensor fragment, that is closed under conjunction, universal quan-
tification, and implication. This fragment arises from transferring to linear
logic the ideas underlying the concurrent constraint programming scheme of
Saraswat (1989).3
2‘An f-structure is locally complete if and only if it contains all the governable gram-
matical functions that its predicate governs. An f-structure is complete if and only if all
its subsidiary f-structures are locally complete. An f-structure is locally coherent if and
only if all the governable grammatical functions that it contains are governed by a local
predicate. An f-structure is coherent if and only if all its subsidiary f-structures are locally
coherent.’ (Kaplan and Bresnan, 1982, pages 211–212)
To illustrate:
(a) *John devoured. [incomplete]
(b) *John arrived Bill the sink. [incoherent]
3 Saraswat and Lincoln (1992) provide an explicit formulation for the higher-order
version of the linear concurrent constraint programming scheme. Scedrov (1993) and
Troelstra (1993) give a tutorial introduction to linear logic itself; Saraswat (1993) supplies
further background on computational aspects of linear logic relevant to the implementation
of the present proposal.
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Our approach shares a number of commonalities with various systems of
categorial syntax and semantics. In particular, the Lambek calculus (Lam-
bek, 1958), introduced as a logic of syntactic combination, turns out to be
a fragment of noncommutative multiplicative linear logic. For a discussion
of how our approach compares to the approach of Lambek and related ap-
proaches (Moortgat, 1988; Hepple, 1990; Morrill, 1990), see Dalrymple et
al. (1994b).
4 Modification
A primary advantage of the use of linear logic ‘glue’ in the derivation of
meanings of sentences is that it enables a clear treatment of modification,
as described in Dalrymple, Lamping, and Saraswat (1993). Consider the
following sentence, containing the sentential modifier ‘obviously’:
(9) Bill obviously appointed Hillary.
We make the standard assumption that the verb ‘appointed’ is the main
syntactic predicate of this sentence. The following is the f-structure for
example (9):
(10)
f :


pred ‘kiss’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:
[
pred ‘Hillary’
]
mods
{[
pred ‘obviously’
]}


We also assume that the meaning of the sentence can be represented by the
following formula:
(11) obviously(kiss(Bill,Hillary))
It is clear that there is a mismatch between the syntactic representation
and the meaning of the sentence; syntactically, the verb is the main functor,
while the main semantic functor is the adverb.4
Recall that linear logic enables a coherent notion of consumption and
production of meanings. We claim that the semantic function of adverbs
(and, indeed, of modifiers in general) is to consume the meaning of the
structure they modify, producing a new, modified meaning. Note below
4The related phenomenon of head switching, discussed in connection with machine
translation by Kaplan et al. (1989) and Kaplan and Wedekind (1993), is also amenable to
treatment along the lines presented here.
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that the meaning of the modified structure f in the meaning constructor
contributed by ‘obviously’ appears on both sides of −◦ ; the unmodified
meaning is consumed, and the modified meaning is produced.
The derivation of the meaning of example (9) is:
bill: gσ❀Bill
hillary: hσ❀Hillary
appointed: ∀X,Y. gσ❀X ⊗ hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y )
obviously: (∀P. fσ = P −◦ fσ = obviously(P ))
bill ⊗ hillary ⊗ appointed ⊗ obviously (Premises.)
⊢ bill-appointed⊗ hillary⊗ obviously X 7→ Bill
⊢ fσ❀appoint (Bill ,Hillary)⊗ obviously Y 7→ Hillary
⊢ obviously(appoint (Bill ,Hillary)) P 7→ appoint (Bill ,Hillary)
The first part of the derivation is the same as the derivation for the sentence
‘Bill appointed Hillary’. The crucial difference is the presence of information
introduced by ‘obviously’. In the last step in the derivation, the linear
implication introduced by ‘obviously’ consumes the previous value for fσ
and produces the new and final value.
By using linear logic, each step of the derivation keeps track of what
‘resources’ have been consumed by linear implications. As mentioned above,
the value for fσ is a meaning for this sentence only if there is no other
information left. Thus, the derivation could not stop at the next to last
step, because the linear implication introduced by ‘obviously’ was still left.
The final step provides the only complete and coherent meaning derivable
for the utterance.
5 Quantification
Our treatment of quantification (Dalrymple et al., 1994a; Dalrymple et al.,
1994b; Dalrymple et al., 1995), and in particular of quantifier scope ambi-
guities and of the interactions between scope and bound anaphora, follows
the analysis of Pereira (1990; 1991), but offers in addition a formal account
of the syntax-semantics interface, which was treated only informally in that
earlier work.
To illustrate our analysis of quantification, we will consider the following
sentence:
(12) Bill convinced everyone.
The f-structure for (12) is:
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(13)
f :


pred ‘convince’
subj g:
[
pred ‘Bill’
]
obj h:
[
pred ‘everyone’
]


We assume that this example has a meaning representable as:
every(person , λz.convince(Bill , z))
Here, we will work with the meaning of a quantifier like ‘everyone’; for a
full exposition of our analysis of quantification and of how a determiner like
‘every’ combines with a noun like ‘person’, see Dalrymple et al. (1994b).
The quantifier ‘everyone’ can be seen as making a semantic contribution
along the following lines:
(14) ∀S. (∀x. fσ❀x −◦ scope❀S(x)) −◦ scope❀every(person , S)
Informally, the constructor for ‘everyone’ can be read as follows: if by giving
the arbitrary meaning x of type e to f , the f-structure for ‘everyone’, we can
derive the meaning S(x) of type t for the scope of quantification scope, then
S can be the property that the quantifier requires as its scope, yielding the
meaning every(person , S) for scope. The quantified NP can thus be seen as
providing two contributions to an interpretation: locally, a referential import
x, which must be discharged when the scope of quantification is established;
and globally, a quantificational import of type (e→ t)→ t, which is applied
to the meaning of the scope of quantification to obtain a quantified propo-
sition. Notice that the assignment of a meaning to scope appears on both
sides of the implication, as in the case of modifiers, and that the meaning is
not the same in the two instances.
We use the place-holder scope in (14) to represent possible choices for
the scope of the quantifier, but we did not specify how this scope was chosen.
Previous work on scope determination in LFG (Halvorsen and Kaplan, 1988)
defined possible scopes at the f-structure level, using inside-out functional
uncertainty to nondeterministically choose a scope f-structure for quantified
noun phrases. That approach requires the scope of a quantified NP to be
an f-structure which contains the NP f-structure. In contrast, our approach
depends only on the logical form of semantic constructors to yield exactly the
appropriate scope choices. Within the constraints imposed by that logical
form, the actual scope can be freely chosen; the linear implication guarantees
that the scope will contain the quantified NP, since only scope meanings
which are obtained by consuming the variable representing the quantified
NP can be chosen.
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Logically, this means that the semantic constructor for an NP quantifies
universally over semantic projections of possible scopes, as follows:
(15) everyone: ∀H,S. (∀x. fσ❀x −◦ H❀S(x)) −◦ H❀every(person , S)
The premises for the derivation of the meaning of example (12) are the
meaning constructors for ‘Bill’, ‘convinced’, and ‘everyone’:
bill: gσ❀Bill
convinced: ∀X,Y. gσ❀X ⊗ hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀convince(X,Y )
everyone: ∀H,S. (∀x. hσ❀x −◦ H❀ tS(x))
−◦ H❀ tevery(person , S)
Notice that we have explicitly indicated that the scope of the quantifier must
be of type t, by means of the subscript t on the ‘means’ relation ❀ t. This
typing is implicit in the schematic formula for quantifiers given in (14).
Giving the name bill-convinced to the formula
bill-convinced: ∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀convince(Bill , Y )
we have the following derivation:
bill⊗ convinced ⊗ everyone (Premises.)
⊢ bill-convinced ⊗ everyone X 7→ Bill
⊢ fσ❀every(person , λz.convince(Bill , z)) H 7→ fσ, Y 7→ x
S 7→ λz.convince(Bill , z)
The formula bill-convinced represents the semantics of the scope of the
determiner ‘every’. No derivation of a different formula fσ❀ tP is possible.
While the formula
∀Y. hσ❀eY −◦ hσ❀eY
could at first sight be considered another possible scope, the type subscript-
ing of the ❀ relation used in the determiner lexical entry requires the scope
to represent a dependency of a proposition on an individual. But this for-
mula represents the dependency of an individual on an individual (itself).
Therefore, it does not provide a valid scope for the quantifier.
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6 Quantifier scope ambiguities
When a sentence contains more than one quantifier, scope ambiguities are of
course possible. In our system, those ambiguities will appear as alternative
successful derivations. We will take as our example this sentence:5
(16) Every candidate appointed a manager.
The f-structure for sentence (16) is:
(17)
f :


pred ‘appoint’
subj g:
[
spec ‘every’
pred ‘candidate’
]
obj h:
[
spec ‘a’
pred ‘manager’
]


The meaning constructors for ‘every candidate’ and ‘a manager’ are analo-
gous to the one for ‘everyone’ in the previous section. The derivation pro-
ceeds from those contributions together with the contribution of ‘appointed’:
every-candidate: ∀G,R. (∀x. gσ❀x −◦ G❀R(x))
−◦ G❀every(candidate , R)
a-manager: ∀H,S. (∀y. hσ❀y −◦ H❀S(y))
−◦ H❀a(manager , S)
appointed: ∀X,Y. gσ❀X ⊗ hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y )
As of yet, we have not made any commitment about the scopes of the
quantifiers; the scope and scope meaning variables in every-candidate and
a-manager have not been instantiated. Scope ambiguities are manifested
in two different ways in our system: through the choice of different semantic
structures G and H, corresponding to different scopes for the quantified
NPs, or through different relative orders of application for quantifiers that
scope at the same point. For this example, the second case is relevant, and
we must now make a choice to proceed. The two possible choices correspond
to two equivalent rewritings of appointed:
appointed1: ∀X. gσ❀X −◦ (∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y ))
appointed2: ∀Y. hσ❀Y −◦ (∀X. gσ❀X −◦ fσ❀appoint (X,Y ))
5To allow for apparent scope ambiguities, we adopt a scoping analysis of indefinites,
as proposed, for example, by Neale (1990).
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These two equivalent forms correspond to the two possible ways of ‘currying’
a two-argument function f : α× β → γ as one-argument functions:
λu.λv.f(u, v) : α→ (β → γ)
λv.λu.f(u, v) : β → (α→ γ)
We select ‘a manager’ to take narrower scope by using the variable instan-
tiations
H 7→ fσ, Y 7→ y, S 7→ λv.appoint (X, v)
and transitivity of implication to combine appointed1 with a-manager
into:
appointed-a-manager: ∀X. gσ❀X
−◦ fσ❀ta(manager , λv.appoint (X, v))
This gives the derivation
every-candidate⊗ appointed1 ⊗ a-manager
⊢ every-candidate⊗ appointed-a-manager
⊢ fσ❀tevery(candidate , λu.a(manager , λv.appoint (u, v)))
of the ∀∃ reading of (16), where the last step uses the substitutions
G 7→ fσ,X 7→ x,R 7→ λu.a(manager , λv.appoint (u, v))
Alternatively, we could have chosen ‘every candidate’ to take narrow
scope, by combining appointed2 with every-candidate to produce:
every-candidate-appointed: ∀Y. hσ❀Y
−◦ fσ❀tevery(candidate , λu.appoint (u, Y ))
This gives the derivation
every-candidate⊗ appointed2 ⊗ a-manager
⊢ every-candidate-appointed⊗ a-manager
⊢ fσ❀ta(manager , λv.every(candidate , λu.appoint (u, v)))
for the ∃∀ reading. These are the only two possible outcomes of the deriva-
tion of a meaning for (16), as required (Dalrymple et al., 1994b).
15
7 Conclusion
Our approach exploits the f-structure of LFG for syntactic information
needed to guide semantic composition, and also exploits the resource-sensitive
properties of linear logic to express the semantic composition requirements
of natural language. The use of linear logic as the glue language in a
deductive semantic framework allows a natural treatment of the syntax-
semantics interface which automatically gives the right results for complete-
ness and coherence constraints and for modification (Dalrymple, Lamping,
and Saraswat, 1993), covers quantifier scoping and bound anaphora (Dal-
rymple et al., 1994b; Dalrymple et al., 1995) and their interactions with
intensionality (Dalrymple et al., 1994a), offers a clean and natural treat-
ment of complex predicate formation (Dalrymple et al., 1993), and extends
nicely to an analysis of the semantics of structure sharing (Dalrymple et al.,
1995).
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